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METAPHOR ACQUISITION AND USE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH 
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 
 
Gabriella Rundblad (King’s College London) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
As previous chapters in this volume have already demonstrated, metaphor is an inherent part of 
human life, not just in terms of how we communicate with others, but also in how we perceive and 
learn about the world and people around us. Utilisation of metaphors in educational contexts is well 
established (Cameron, 2003), and is in no way limited to language learning and literacy. In fact, it is 
almost impossible to learn about science without the use of metaphors (Jakobson & Wickman, 2007; 
Niebert, Marsch, & Treagust, 2012; see also Chapter 25). Metaphor is also crucial in establishing, 
expressing and negotiating our own identity with others (see Chapter 32). In everyday life, metaphor 
is seldom a one-way communication tool, rather it is essential that both speaker and hearer utilise 
metaphor in a similar fashion. But what happens if a person cannot or struggle to learn to understand 
and appropriately use metaphors?  
 
This chapter will discuss to what extent individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, such as 
Autism Spectrum Disorder, find metaphor acquisition difficult. By studying metaphor in atypically 
developing individuals, we can better grasp what most likely underpins normal metaphor acquisition 
and use, and by contrasting disorders, we can attain insight into how difficulties with metaphors can 
(potentially) be overcome. We will also address which types of metaphors have been investigated and 
how these types relate to cognitive linguistic theory. Although there are numerous 
neurodevelopmental disorders, metaphor studies have to date been limited to five disorders: Specific 
Language Impairment (SLI), Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Down’s syndrome (DS), Williams 
syndrome (WS), and Schizophrenia.1 Before outlining how the term metaphor has been applied in 
studies of atypical language development and what these studies have found, we first need to briefly 
introduce the neurodevelopmental disorders that this chapter will focus on. 
 
Neurodevelopmental disorders   
 
The development of the human brain and nervous system starts already in the early prenatal stage. 
When this growth is impaired, we can often discern an impact on the child’s behaviour, emotion, 
memory, intelligence, and/or language. The causes of neurodevelopmental disorders are typically 
genetic. New genetic disorders are continuously discovered, but whether these disorders include 
abnormal language development remains to be established. At the same time, well-researched, 
genetically complex, language disorders such as SLI and ASD are still under active investigation (Carter 
& Scherer, 2013; Simpson et al., 2015). In the case of SLI, data from behavioural studies targeting 
language performance are well established, while investigations into the cause and origin of the 
disorder remain (at least in part) inconclusive. For ASD, we find a great need for more detailed 





Specific Language Impairment (SLI) 
SLI is the standard diagnosis applied to children who report with (moderate to severe) atypical 
language development in the absence of another diagnosis. In other words, the language impairment 
cannot be ascribed to a physical handicap, environmental deprivation or a lower than average 
cognitive ability (Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5), 2013). The exact 
definition of this disorder has been debated for decades (Bishop, 1997). In practice, this means that 
some children who are later diagnosed with another neurodevelopmental disorder might have first 
been given the diagnosis of SLI. Although SLI is commonly thought of as a language-only disorder, 
studies have shown co-morbidity with poor motor skills (Hill, 2001; Richtsmeier & Goffman, in press), 
poor auditory perception (Bishop & McArthur, 2004), and most recently a correlation between 
linguistic and cognitive ability (Liao et al., 2015).  
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
Individuals with ASD are commonly divided into three main subgroups: Asperger syndrome, high 
functioning ASD, and low functioning ASD. However in DSM-5, Asperger’s was eliminated and 
collapsed under ASD (Kent et al., 2013). In contrast to individuals with low functioning ASD, some of 
whom use five or fewer words per day,2 individuals with high functioning ASD present with ‘relatively 
and selectively preserved language and cognitive abilities’ (Felder, McPartland, Klin, & Volkmar, 2014, 
p. 1). Some studies prefer to distinguish between ASD with normal language and with language 
impairment. Similar to the distinction between high functioning and low functioning ASD, ASD 
individuals with normal language and with language impairment typically differ significantly on tests 
measuring verbal IQ and non-verbal IQ. Nevertheless, characteristics common for both groups 
(regardless of label) include difficulties with social communication, social interaction, and social 
imagination – all of which are often paired with challenging behaviour.  
 
Down’s syndrome (DS) 
DS is caused by a partial or full trisomy of chromosome 21, which can often be identified prenatally 
by a nuchal translucency scan, alternatively through an amniocentesis test. Individuals with DS have 
distinct facial appearances, but also suffer from heart conditions among other physical conditions. 
They typically present with non-verbal IQ ranging from 35 to 70 (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000). Children 
with DS are delayed in their language development. However, it is important to note that it is 
predominantly syntax acquisition that is affected, thus they ‘show an incongruence between 
nonverbal cognition and grammatical development but a congruence between vocabulary and 
nonverbal cognitive skills’ (Rice et al., 2005, p. 20). 
 
Williams syndrome (WS) 
WS is a rare genetic disorder that is caused by a micro-deletion on the long arm of chromosome 
7q11.23. Individuals with WS are recognisable by their dysmorphic facial characteristics, hoarse voice, 
and overfriendly behaviour, and in addition they tend to suffer from a range of health conditions (e.g. 
kidney problems and joint abnormalities). WS is also associated with impaired cognitive ability, with 
non-verbal IQ ranging between 40 and 100 (Pober, 2010). Similarly to DS, children with WS show 
strength in their vocabulary acquisition, but struggle with grammar. 
 
Schizophrenia 
Unlike the previous four disorders, which without a doubt are neurodevelopmental in origin, 
Schizophrenia displays a much greater variability in age of onset,3 as well as a greater number of 
candidate genes. This heterogeneity has called into question whether Schizophrenia is a 
neurodevelopmental disorder or a degenerative brain process (Gross & Huber, 2008). It has recently 
been argued that its ’illness-related cognitive impairment is neurodevelopmental in origin and 
characterized by slower gain (developmental lag) but not cognitive decline’ and that ‘the severity of 
underlying neurodevelopmental abnormality determines the age that cognitive deficits first become 
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apparent’ (Bora, 2015, p. 1). Although Schizophrenia is typically classified after psychosis sets in, the 
declining cognitive profile of those who will go on to be diagnosed with Schizophrenia has been said 
to be striking enough that individuals could be identified (and potentially treated) much earlier (Kahn 
& Keefe, 2013). 
 
These five neurodevelopmental disorders overlap to various degrees in several respects. Similar to 
Schizophrenia, some individuals with ASD experience paranoid ideations (Jänsch & Hare, 2014; 
Unenge Hallerbäck, Lugnegård, & Gillberg, 2012). DS, WS and low functioning ASD share a below 
average cognitive ability, but only DS and WS feature distinct physiology. Although SLI is defined as 
language impairment without cognitive impairment and high functioning ASD (or ASD with normal 
language) is thought of as normal language ability without cognitive impairment, the social 
communication impairment of ASD can generate a linguistic representation almost indistinguishable 
to that of a child with SLI. In other words, clinical linguists and educational psychologists are often 
faced with the task of dissecting whether a child’s language is abnormal due to a neurodevelopmental 
language impairment or is the by-product of ‘awkward’ language in an overwhelming social situation 
that is often further impaired by inappropriate behaviour.  
 
We will return to the five disorders in Section 2, but first we will briefly outline a few points about 
methodology and terminology, since, as shall become apparent, many of the inconsistent results in 
this field stem from the methodological approach and terminology applied. 
 
Methodology, terminology and critical issues 
 
Studies of developmental disorders have commonly compared performance (e.g. on a language task) 
in a disorder group with both a typically developing (TD) group matched for chronological age, and a 
second TD group matched on mental age, where mental age can be linked to verbal ability or non-
verbal ability. In matching approaches, significant differences in performance between the disorder 
group and both control groups are interpreted as impairment. An absence of difference between the 
disorder group and the mental age control group (i.e. both these groups differ significantly from the 
chronological age control group), on the other hand, is indicative of delay rather than impairment. 
More recent approaches, such as developmental trajectories or growth models employ a wide age 
range4 to be able to gauge performance development (Thomas et al., 2009). Statistical analysis using 
a linear regression model plots performance against chronological age as well as mental age. 
Developmental trajectories allow comparison between groups for onset and rate of development, 
which in turn enables clear discrimination between delay due to late onset, delay due to slow rate of 
development and impairment. 5  Both approaches have been utilised in studies of metaphor in 
neurodevelopmental disorders. 
 
One of the primary issues in psycholinguistic and clinical linguistic studies of figurative language is the 
lack of consensus around the term metaphor. At best, the term is applied in accordance with the 
definitions outlined in earlier chapters of this volume. Thus, we find that some studies have targeted 
clearly defined types of metaphors; for example, sensory metaphors (Van Herwegen, Dimitriou, & 
Rundblad, 2013) and primary metaphors  (Olofson et al., 2014; Özçalişkan, 2005). But at the opposite 
end, we find studies of so-called ‘child metaphors’, which have been extensively questioned (Gentner, 
1988). In one of his early papers, Kanner (1946, p. 242) described instances where a child with ASD 
would use ‘metaphorical language’ or ‘irrelevant phrases’, such as ‘Peter eater’ for saucepans because 
the child’s mother had once said ‘Peter, Peter, pumpkin eater’ while dropping a saucepan. There is, 
thus, also a tendency to overextend metaphor for other linguistic devices. In addition, we find 
metaphors grouped under umbrella terms such as pragmatics, inference, analogy, figure of speech, 
figurative language, lexical ambiguity and polysemy, usually together with other devices that are not 
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metaphors (e.g. idioms, irony, similes, metonymy, hyperbole and litotes) (Rundblad & Annaz, 2010a). 
In this chapter, we will exclusively look at studies where the test materials included metaphors, 
notably linguistic realisations of conventional conceptual metaphors (e.g. exploding for ‘very angry’), 
sensory metaphors (e.g. smooth for ‘charming’) and perceptual metaphors (e.g. flying for ‘running 
fast’).  
 
In the context of neurodevelopmental disorders involving language, it is imperative that we 
investigate the full-time course of an individual’s language development. This means that we need to 
include age as an independent variable, in some way; preferably by means of longitudinal studies. We 
need to be able to distinguish whether the individuals’ atypical language is delayed or potentially 
irrevocably impaired. Further, to get a clear picture of what areas of language are affected and in what 
way, it is essential that clear and delineated terminology, based on current linguistic theory, is 
employed. The relation between language and cognition can be very complex. Each type of figurative 
language has most likely its own course of development, and it has also been argued that some types 
of figurative language function as a stepping stone or scaffold for more complex types (Rundblad & 
Annaz, 2010a). Theory specific and age sensitive studies are crucial. 
 
In the next section, we will look at the extent to which the different types of metaphors identified and 
described in cognitive linguistic theory have been investigated in atypical language populations. To 
this end, we will briefly review studies of metaphor comprehension, processing and production for 
each of the five disorders outlined above.  
 
2. ACQUISITION AND USE 
 
There are three main components to the study of acquisition and use of metaphors: comprehension, 
production, and processing. Studies focusing on the acquisition of metaphor commonly look at either 
comprehension or production. Production also overlaps with processing, in its focus on metaphor use. 
However, the greatest overlap is between processing and comprehension. An important feature of 
processing studies is the need to test novel metaphors as opposed to lexicalised ones. When 
participants are tested on lexicalised metaphors, they retrieve the meaning directly from the mental 
lexicon. In child language studies, it can at times be impossible to ensure that a lexicalised metaphor 
is not unfamiliar, and thus novel, to individual children. Novel metaphors, on the other hand, require 
the language user to create meaning, and it is that process of creation that processing studies target. 
Each of these three areas tend to be associated with specific research techniques; brain scans are 
nowadays increasingly utilised in processing studies, while stories form a significant part of many 
comprehension studies.  
 
There are sadly only a few metaphor studies in DS, and some of these are actually studies where DS 
participants function as a control group, rather than being the focus of the study. It is possible that 
this shortcoming is at least partially due to the general assumption that language in DS is ‘merely’ 
delayed. In short, we should expect to find the same patterns, whether for comprehension, processing 
or production, in DS as for TDs, except that onset is later and possibly the rate of development is 




In comprehension tasks, participants need to communicate what they understand the target 
metaphor to mean, unlike processing studies where they typically select ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to signal whether 
a test sentence is meaningful or not. This can be achieved by the participant selecting an option, which 
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could be a picture, synonym or definition. Comprehension tasks where the participant is required to 
verbalise their understanding can, on the other hand, affect performance in disorder groups and very 
young TD children negatively; yet, data from such tasks can be very informative and should not be 
discouraged. 
 
One thing that can complicate metaphor comprehension is difference in executive function. Executive 
function includes ‘a variety of higher order strategic/organizational cognitive functions including 
inhibition, working memory, attentional flexibility and planning’ (Rhodes, Riby, Park, Fraser, & 
Campbell, 2010, p. 1217). Both DS and WS are associated with impaired executive function (Rhodes 
et al., 2010; Rowe, Lavender, & Turk, 2006). In a rare DS case study, an adult Italian woman was 
required to verbally explain what each target metaphor means (Papagno & Vallar, 2001). The study 
concluded that metaphor comprehension was impaired, and suggested that the poor performance 
could be linked to the participant’s impaired visuo-spatial ability and executive function.  Similarly, 11 
WS individuals were required to explain the meaning of two statements in a story: one metaphoric 
and one sarcastic (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-Cohen, 1995). The authors found a 
very strong positive correlation between metaphor and sarcasm ability. Importantly, only half of the 
participants succeeded on the task. More recently, comprehension on lexicalised metaphor was 
tested in 30 WS individuals between the age of 7;016 and  39;10 years old (Rundblad, Dimitriou, & Van 
Herwegen, in press). The task utilised pictures in order to reduce executive function demand. Using a 
developmental trajectories approach, the study found that onset of metaphor comprehension in the 
WS population is around 6 years old and comprehension does improve with chronological age as well 
as verbal ability – a result which is attributed to the fact that the test sample included middle aged WS 
adults. In order to determine whether performance truly is delayed or impaired, it is necessary to test 
a much larger age range than what is normal in TD language studies.  
 
Results from an early study with children with SLI suggested that metaphor comprehension in this 
disorder is intact (Vance & Wells, 1994). The test materials included idioms, dead metaphors as well 
as perceptual metaphors, and a forced choice out of three pictures was used to indicate 
comprehension. In forced-choice designs, participants must indicate their understanding by selecting 
one answer from three (or more) options provided, which are usually in picture format. Generally, 
these depict the intended metaphorical meaning, a possible but less likely literal meaning, and one or 
more distractors. However, the TD children were matched on verbal ability rather than chronological 
age, and were thus significantly younger (6;4-7;8 years old) than the SLI children (7;10 – 13;1 years 
old). Contrasting verbal and visual metaphor comprehension, Highnam and colleagues (1999, p. 27) 
tested 12 children who were ‘language disordered’ but with a performance IQ score above 80 on 
WISC-R and 12 age-matched TD controls. The study used the Metaphoric Triads Task  (Kogan, Connor, 
Gross, & Fava, 1980), which includes sensory metaphors, perceptual metaphors and conceptual 
metaphors (Kogan & Chadrow, 1986).7 Results showed better comprehension in the TD group for both 
visual and verbal metaphors, and both groups performed better on visual metaphors. Highnam and 
colleagues (1999, p. 30) suggest that ‘the iconicity of metaphors in visual form renders them less 
abstract than the more highly arbitrary medium of verbal coding’, but also that visual metaphor tasks 
are mediated by language and thus are affected to a greater degree in individuals with language 
impairments. There are no recent studies that specifically target metaphor comprehension in SLI (but 
see discussion of sentence completion tasks in the metaphor production section below). 
 
There are numerous metaphor comprehension studies in ASD, most of which have looked at children 
and adolescents with high functioning ASD or Asperger’s. Two studies using the same metaphor 
comprehension task, one with high functioning ASD children (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001) and 
one with high functioning ASD adolescents (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1995), found significantly 
worse performance compared to TD controls matched on chronological age and non-verbal ability. 
One of the reasons put forth as underlying the impaired performance, but which was not tested for, 
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was a lower ability to detect the intentionality behind the metaphorical utterance (Dennis et al., 2001). 
More recently, a small sample of ASD children (age range 5;4-11;4) were compared to age-matched 
TD controls on comprehension of lexicalised metaphors incorporated into short stories, where 
participants were required to express their understanding (Rundblad & Annaz, 2010b). Onset of 
comprehension in the ASD children was found to be around age 7.5 years. Using developmental 
trajectories, the study found that metaphor comprehension was severely impaired in the ASD group 
as it did not improve reliably with chronological age, nor with increasing verbal ability. The authors 
also looked at the effect of Theory of Mind (ToM) on comprehension (Baron-Cohen, 2001; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). ToM refers to the ability to mind read or infer other people’s feelings, 
intentions and thoughts. A crucial distinction is made between first-order ToM (i.e. ‘I think person X 
thinks Y’) and second-order ToM (i.e. ‘I think person X thinks person Y thinks Z’), where second-order 
ToM is more complex and therefore typically develops later than first-order ToM. Although, the 
authors had presumed a correlation between first-order ToM abilities based on results for metaphor 
production in this population (Happé, 1993), no such link could be found.  
 
In a study of pragmatic comprehension in 25 adults with Schizophrenia, metaphor comprehension 
was measured using a computerised story task where participants were required to select ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
to indicate whether an utterance made sense (Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2002).  Results 
showed impaired metaphor understanding as well as poor first-order ToM abilities and executive 
function deficits; however, no causal link between first-order ToM and metaphor comprehension 
could be established, unlike irony comprehension which did show an association with first-order ToM. 
In contrast, Mo and colleagues (2008) did find a correlation between metaphor comprehension and 
second-order ToM abilities, while irony showed no correlation, when testing 29 participants with 
Schizophrenia. These results are interesting and potentially conflicting, given the common assumption 
that irony is harder to comprehend than metaphor, and thus should require second-order ToM 
abilities (Happé, 1993).  
 
Recent years have seen metaphor comprehension studies extend towards novel metaphors, testing 
whether lexicalised metaphors are understood earlier and better. Thus, Hebrew-speaking children 
with ASD tested on visual metaphors (i.e. the Metaphoric Triads Task), lexicalised metaphors and 
novel metaphors, proved to perform better on visual metaphors, though they performed worse on all 
metaphor tasks compared to age-matched TDs (Mashal & Kasirer, 2012).  Interestingly, the study also 
found a relative weakness in suppressing irrelevant contextual information in the ASD group, but no 
difference between novel and lexicalised metaphors.  
 
An investigation using a forced-choice picture design of 34 children and adults with WS tested 
performance on novel sensory metaphors (e.g. marshmallow meaning ‘a soft pillow’) and non-sensory 
metaphors (e.g. turtle referring to ‘a slow car’) (Van Herwegen et al., 2013). The study found that 
onset of novel metaphor comprehension is around the age of 8 in WS and comprehension did not 
improve with chronological age or with verbal ability; instead a significant impairment, compared to 
age-matched TDs controls, was established. Although the stories and pictures were specifically 
designed to be suited to WS participants with poor working memory, it is still possible that poor 
comprehension was due to impaired executive function, which was not included in analysis.  
 
Olofson and colleagues tested comprehension of novel and lexicalised primary conceptual metaphors 
in children and adolescents with ASD (age range 7;03-22;03) and age-matched TD controls (Olofson 
et al., 2014).  The ASD group was partly recruited from a mainstream school and partly from a private 
ASD centre, which could indicate a division between high functioning and low functioning ASD. 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and Grady’s theory of primary 
conceptual metaphors (Grady, 1999) hold that primary metaphors are acquired through embodied 
experiences very early in childhood. Thus, we should expect no improvement in performance with 
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increasing chronological age and no difference in performance due to lexicalisation. The study found 
that ASD participants understood novel and lexicalised primary metaphors equally well, albeit not as 
well as the TD controls.  Further, it was found that chronological age did not impact performance at 
all, but that verbal ability was a marginally significant predictor for novel metaphor comprehension 
for both ASDs and TDs. There was also an indication of better performance on lexicalised metaphors 
in the mainstream ASD group, but with a sample size of 13, replication is necessary before firm 




Online processing tasks typically involve error rates, reaction time or eye tracking measures. Reaction 
time studies commonly combine with some form of neurological technique, such as fMRI, ERP and 
TMS8. Studies of metaphor processing have thus far been limited to Schizophrenia and ASD (to date, 
ASD studies have predominantly been limited to Asperger’s). 
 
A key focus in metaphor processing has been on lexicalised versus novel metaphors, often under the 
auspices of Giora’s (1997) Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH). Although, GSH originated in the context 
of idioms, it has been extended to metaphors. GSH argues that whether a word is used in its literal or 
figurative meaning is far less relevant than whether that word and its intended meaning is 
familiar/lexicalised and salient in the context that it occurs in. Therefore, GSH predicts that 
performance on lexicalised metaphors will be better than on novel ones. Based on two experiments 
in Hebrew measuring error rates and reaction time with young adult TD controls and young adults 
with Asperger’s, Giora and colleagues (2012) found consistent evidence that both test groups 
performed better on familiar metaphors. While controls did not struggle to process novel metaphor, 
the Asperger’s participants needed a supportive (i.e. salient) context to be able to judge them as 
meaningful. 
 
Like neurological TD studies, neurodevelopmental disorder studies have also sought to address 
whether metaphor resolution is linked to a right hemisphere or a left hemisphere superiority. An fMRI 
study on German adults with Schizophrenia tracked the signal changes caused by novel metaphor 
processing to the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) alone (Kircher, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Rapp, 2007), 
while healthy individuals displayed signal changes in the left lateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45/47) 
and the right superior/middle temporal gyrus (BA 39) (Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2004). In 
parallel Hebrew study, Mashal and colleagues (2013) tested both lexicalised and novel metaphors. 
The healthy controls displayed the same pattern for novel metaphors as the previous study, namely 
that both hemispheres are recruited. The clinical group, on the other hand, exhibited a failure to 
recruit the right hemisphere and a consequent compensatory recruitment of the left middle frontal 
gyrus (BA 46) and the left precuneus (BA 7). In a study featuring Asperger’s individuals and TD controls, 
a visual field paradigm9 was used that required participants to make semantic judgements about word 
pairs, including perceptual lexicalised and novel metaphors (Gold & Faust, 2010). As for Schizophrenia, 
the right hemisphere contributed less to novel metaphor processing in the Asperger’s participants, 
negatively affecting their performance. Right hemisphere processing is specific for novel metaphors 
only (Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 2012), in line with GSH.  
 
ERP studies of semantic processing in Schizophrenia have generally found greater N400 amplitudes.  
N400 is a downward spike detectable around 400 milliseconds after the stimulus is presented and is 
typical when processing words and meanings. The greater N400 amplitudes mean the semantic 
processing ‘cost’ in Schizophrenia is generally greater than in the general population. In a French study 
of individuals with Schizophrenia versus healthy controls, participants were tested on 160 highly 
lexicalised metaphor (Iakimova, Passerieux, Laurent, & Hardy-Bayle, 2005). Results showed longer 
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reaction time latencies and greater N400 amplitudes for the clinical group. However, greater 
amplitudes were found for all test conditions. Thus, the study concluded that there was no evidence 
of a specific metaphor processing deficit, but instead individuals with Schizophrenia display a general 
reduced efficiency in integrating and making sense of the semantic context.  
 
Gold and colleagues (2010) tested 17 adults with Asperger’s and 16 controls (all Hebrew speakers) on 
60 lexicalised metaphors and 60 novel metaphors elicited from poetry. The Asperger’s group elicited 
greater N400 amplitudes for metaphors, with differences between lexicalised and novel stimuli being 
clearly discernible. Thus, a similar inability to integrate semantic information is found for Asperger’s, 
as we saw for Schizophrenia. In a follow-up paper, Gold and Faust put forth the argument that 
individuals with Asperger’s experience difficulties with novel metaphors because these ‘violate 
semantic rules, in a non-systemized manner’ (2012, p. 67). It is, thus, the well-established ToM 




There are significantly fewer production studies compared to comprehension and processing, most 
likely due to many neurodevelopmental disorders affecting speech and fluency, making production 
studies more challenging. We can discern two types of production designs: a) the participant produces 
coherent speech which can vary in length from a short sentence to a story or retelling, and b) the 
participant responds verbally with an answer, which usually is less than a sentence long, but which 
crucially includes the sought metaphor. It should be noted that some studies prefer to classify 
sentence completion tasks as comprehension tasks rather than production tasks. 
 
Comparing performance between individuals with ASD with a control group of individuals with 
moderate learning difficulties (matched on verbal ability), Happé (1993) utilised a sentence 
completion task where participants were required to select a simile, metaphor, or a synonym from a 
list of target words that also included one distractor item. Although the author does not discuss 
metaphor types tested, the targets listed suggest that they were lexicalised perceptual metaphors 
(e.g. ‘The dancer…was a swan’). Heavily influenced by Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; see 
Chapter 4), Happé opted to sub-divide the ASD group by performance on a battery of ToM tasks. The 
battery consisted of first-order and second-order ToM tasks, and ASD participants were divided into 
three groups: failed both types of tasks, passed only first-order tasks, and passed both types of tasks. 
Both individuals with ASD and with moderate learning difficulties performed equally well on synonyms 
and similes, but for the metaphor condition, the ASD participants who had failed both ToM tasks 
performed significantly worse. The use of a verbal ability matched control group suggests that the 
difference in performance is not due to general verbal ability, instead Happé suggested the main 
contributor to metaphor ability is ToM ability. However, this study did not control for age (i.e. there 
was a wide age range (10–28 years old)) and there was no TD control group.  
 
Happé’s study was replicated by Norbury (2005), who included a TD group (matched on chronological 
age and non-verbal ability) as well as additional background measures for verbal ability. The age range 
in Norbury’s study was 8-15 years old. Unlike Happé’s study, this study included several disorder 
groups: SLI, Pragmatic Language Impairment, and Asperger’s/high functioning ASD/ASD. In contrast 
to Happé’s results, Norbury found that verbal ability contributed significantly more than ToM ability 
to metaphor performance. However, one of the verbal ability tasks actually contained metaphors, 
which could explain the discrepancy compared to Happé’s results for ToM abilty. Nevertheless, these 
two studies show a clear impairment in metaphor production in ASD and quite likely in SLI as well, as 




Neither Norbury nor Happé sought to determine when metaphor production first starts to develop in 
ASD and SLI, but Norbury’s results showed that performance improves with age. A recent study testing 
Hebrew speaking adults with high functioning ASD and TD controls found that the high functioning 
ASD group was not only more prolific at producing metaphors for common emotions, but they also 
created more novel metaphors (Kasirer & Mashal, 2014). This study used a sentence completion task, 
and participants were particularly encouraged to be creative. It might seem as if this result is at odds 
when compared to the previous studies. However, metaphor as a tool to describe one’s disorder and 
perception of self is well documented in the adult ASD community (Blackman, 2014; Williams, 1998). 
In fact, Williams sees life with ASD as living a metaphor. Blackman, who is non-verbal and 
communicates by typing, describes herself as wordless, with language inside her, but when she writes 
poetry she needs to stand outside herself to look at who she is. It seems that a pronounced focus on 
self is typical for poets with ASD (Roth, 2008). Many of the metaphors used by individuals with ASD 
are sensory in nature; they are generally understandable, yet strikingly different. These novel sensory 
metaphors could perhaps be explained by Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2013, p. 40) finding that 
synaesthesia, which is ‘a neurodevelopmental condition in which a sensation in one modality triggers 
a perception in a second modality’, is three times as common in adults with ASD than in TDs. This 
study included predominantly individuals with high functioning ASD/Asperger’s. If indeed the 
metaphors generated in Kasirer and Mashal’s study are due to their participants being synaesthets, it 
is debatable whether we should treat them as metaphors at all. 
 
Using a wordless picture book that participants needed to tell a story about, Naylor and Van Herwegen 
(2012) looked at production of metaphors along with several other figurative language devices in 
individuals with WS (age range: 7-18 years) and age-matched TD controls. Unfortunately for our 
purpose, the different figurative language devices were not separated in the analysis, nor were types 
of metaphors distinguished. The study found no reliable developmental trajectory for either group 
when plotting results against chronological age. The authors concluded therefore that since there was 
also no significant difference in frequency of metaphors produced, there is no delay or impairment in 
metaphor production in WS. However, closer scrutiny of the study show that performance improved 
significantly with better non-verbal ability and verbal ability10 in the WS group alone. This difference 
between the two groups could be indicative of a delay in early metaphor production in the WS group 
that had disappeared by the time they participated in the study.  
 
Schizophrenia is associated with increasingly atypical language, especially in areas such as semantics 
and pragmatics (Salavera, Puyuelo, Antonanzas, & Teruel, 2013), with similarities often being drawn 
with the language of ASD. The earliest studies of metaphor production in Schizophrenia did not 
distinguish metaphor from similes, but interestingly found frequent use of figurative language  (Billow, 
Rossman, Lewis, Goldman, & Raps, 1997). In a recent study, Dutch speaking adults diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia (all with average non-verbal IQ) and age-matched controls were asked to describe an 
emotional event in their personal life (Elvevåg, Helsen, De Hert, Sweers, & Storms, 2011). Coding for 
‘spontaneous metaphors’ (which we equate with linguistic realisations of ‘conceptual metaphors’), 
surprisingly few metaphors were found and there was no statistically significant difference in 
production between the Schizophrenia group and the control group. The authors suggest that this low 
incidence could be due to anhedonia in the clinical group, which was not measured; however, that 




As this section has shown, studies of metaphor acquisition and use have made great progress 
investigating neurodevelopmental disorders, though less so in DS and SLI. Consistently, individuals 
with SLI, ASD, DS, WS, and Schizophrenia perform below TD/healthy controls, with child studies 
  
10 
suggesting a delayed onset of metaphor acquisition or slower rate of development of metaphor 
abilities. In the case of WS, DS and SLI, there is some indication that performance will improve with 
time, while ASD and Schizophrenia show severe impairment that persists into (early) adulthood, 
especially with regards to novel metaphors.  The next section will discuss how these results tie in with 
theories and models, and whether there is scope and reason for intervention. 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND INTERVENTION 
 
There is generally a strong focus in neurodevelopmental studies on theoretical accounts that seek to 
explain why non-neurotypical individuals differ in their performance compared to controls. The three 
main theories, which are not at all metaphor or language specific, are ToM, executive function, and 
weak central coherence (WCC). There is some overlap between WCC and GSH in their emphasis on 
salience and context, but unlike WCC, GSH is specific to figurative language.  
 
Although it seems clear that executive function easily impacts performance in various disorders, 
especially those associated with below average non-verbal ability (i.e. WS and DS), the role it plays in 
metaphor acquisition and use is more to do with its effect on language overall. In particular, intact 
executive function is needed to process the sentences and stories that make up the test materials. 
Therefore, executive dysfunction is only a partial explanation, and should preferably be controlled for 
experimentally.  
 
This chapter has outlined great variability in results with regard to ToM. Some studies have found very 
clear links between metaphor performance and first-order ToM, while others found no correlations 
at all. ToM can, like WCC, be tested in a great many ways and it is possible that the choice of ToM task 
contributes to whether a relation is found or not. However, there is increasing suggestion that while 
ToM and metaphor acquisition and use are impaired in many individuals with one of our five disorders, 
ToM need not be a prerequisite to using and understanding some or all  aspects of metaphoric 
language (Tendahl & Gibbs Jr, 2008). Importantly, there is evidence suggesting that the development 
of language skills precedes the development of ToM, thus reducing the likelihood of causal link (Hale 
& Tager Flusberg, 2003). The question we ask is whether ToM is needed for some metaphors. 
 
GSH stresses the importance of context for metaphor resolution; however, context reliance is abated 
in the case of familiar (i.e. lexicalised) metaphors. There is compelling evidence that novel metaphors 
are harder to comprehend and process, and that they are more reliant on salience. The conspicuously 
more demanding nature of novel metaphors is also visible in hemisphere/hemifield studies that show 
a clear connection between metaphor failure and failure to sufficiently activate the right hemisphere. 
Putting all the evidence in favour of GSH aside, we also need to address instances where the predicted 
difference between lexicalised and novel metaphors fails to realise.     
 
Cognitive linguistics assumes that early metaphor development is grounded in embodied experience 
(Gibbs, Lima, & Francozo, 2004). Studies that have tested young children on primary metaphors have 
found that once acquired, performance on novel primary metaphors are as good as for lexicalised 
metaphors. This raises the issue as to what types of metaphors have been tested. Generally, mixed 
types of metaphors have been selected, and very few disorder studies have exclusively focused on 
conceptual metaphors, preferring more traditional types such as perceptual metaphors. It is very likely 
that the conflicting results in the studies discussed in this chapter are the product of non-conceptual 
metaphors actually relying on ToM and salience, while conceptual and primary metaphors do not. 
 
Turning to the question of practical applications, we quickly note that there are few intervention 
studies, yet ASD authors such as Williams and Blackman describe how they have ‘retrained’ their 
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thinking, suggesting intervention as a viable and desirable avenue. Mashal and Kasirer (2011) 
specifically focussed on novel metaphors. They used ‘thinking maps’ to teach ASD children the 
semantic relations between words that the children might not even have noticed are related. The 
outcome of the study showed an improvement in novel metaphor comprehension, as well as a 
correlation with semantic knowledge. 
 
It is clear that further studies of metaphor acquisition and use are greatly needed, and in addition to 
cross-sectional studies, we need longitudinal studies with and without interventions. These needs are 
addressed in the next section. 
 
4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
The most apparent and acute need is that we devise more systematic ways of testing metaphors that 
highlight the patterns that different sub-types of metaphor may give rise to. Even primary metaphors, 
which for a long time seem to have been one homogeneous group, are susceptible to differences 
between subgroups (Siqueira & Gibbs, 2007), and TD results for complex conceptual metaphors 
(Lachaud, 2013) need to be replicated and extended to atypical populations. Further, a wider range of 
potential underlying abilities need to consistently be tested for, to determine the extent to which they 
can predict metaphor performance. Thereafter, theory driven intervention studies should be designed 
to address whether targeting established underlying abilities (e.g. sense relations or ToM) can improve 
performance of different types of metaphors, or whether utilising the differences and links between 
metaphorical sub-types or other figurative language devices (e.g. metonymy) could have an even 
greater impact. 
 
Delayed or impaired metaphor acquisition is not specific to neurodevelopmental disorders, e.g. 
individuals with unilateral cochlear implants struggle with metaphors despite normal discourse 
inference comprehension (Nicastri et al., 2014). We thus need to extend the atypical populations we 
study in order to get a more comprehensive overview of performance, underlying factors and 
obstacles.  In addition, language investigations of siblings to individuals with neurodevelopmental 
disorders (Jones & Conti-Ramsden, 1997; Yirmiya et al., 2006) forces the question as to how wide the 
disorder spectrum might be and where the ‘true’ boundaries for abnormal language may lie. 
 
Finally, one of the ‘default’ problems with any area of psycholinguistic research is the relative 
abundance of studies on English. A related issue is publication language; for example, there is 
increasing research in Korean on executive function and metaphor comprehension in SLI (Hong & Yim, 
2014) and metaphor/simile production in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Lim, 2010), but 
these publications are only available in Korean. Access to published studies should whenever possible, 




1 A substantial number of people have one of these five neurodevelopmental disorders. In the UK, the combined 
prevalence rate is estimated to approximately 9%, with SLI contributing 7% and ASD 1% of that figure (Baird et 
al., 2006; Nation, 2008). 
2 Approximately 20 percent of children with ASD are nonverbal (Rice et al., 2005). 
3 Earliest age of onset is 13 years. 
4 In matching approaches, it is essential that the age range within the disorder and TD groups is comparatively 
narrow. Matching studies can of course include age as an additional, well-defined independent ordinal variable 
(i.e. the study would include two or more age samples per group). 
5 While it is very hard to imagine some form of ‘catching up’ for the last two, it is possible that a child with 
delayed onset carries on developing when typical peers have reached mature performance. 
6 7;01 stands for 7 years and 1 month. 
7 Note that Kogan and colleagues label the first two types of metaphors physiognomic and configural. 
8 While structural MRI can detect brain size differences (e.g. ASD is associated with overall larger brain areas, 
except for the corpus callosum which is smaller (Stanfield et al., 2008)), fMRI (i.e. functional magnetic resonance 
imaging), ERPs (i.e. event-related (brain) potentials) and TMS (i.e. transcranial magnetic stimulation) can 
determine areas of brain activation (Friederici, Pfeifer, & Hahne, 1993; Gabrieli et al., 1996; George, 
Wassermann, & Post, 1995). Note that although TMS has been used in both ASD and Schizophrenia, metaphor 
studies using TMS are still lacking in disorder populations. Similarly, fMRI studies in ASD have targeted irony. 
9  This experimental technique presents visual stimuli either on the left (causing signals go to the right 
hemisphere) or the right (transmitted to the left hemisphere) visual field. If the participant performs better on 
items displayed on the left, the conclusion that the right hemisphere has a functional advantage can be drawn, 
and vice versa for right field presentations. 
10 Notably, synonym ability yielded the strongest trajectory. 
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